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1. Media philosophy: discourse or discipline?
It is beyond any doubt that media have an enormous impact on our 
media-culture societies. Media inﬂuence our perception and our knowledge, 
our memory as well as our emotions. They create public spheres and public 
opinions and give rise to media realities. Media shape our socialisation and 
our communality. They transform economy, politics, science, religion and 
law. “What we know about our society, even about our world we are liv-
ing in, we know via the mass media.” (Luhmann 1996:9; my translation) 
Accordingly, “the media” have become a paramount subject of interdiscipli-
nary discourses in the last decades all over the world. 
All these developments have become topics of scientiﬁc analyses as well 
as parts of media programmes. Since decades, various academic disciplines 
focused on an other-observation (“Fremdbeobachtung”) of the media from 
an external state, whereas the media increasingly tend to observe themselves 
as well as one another in order to transform this self-observation into parts 
of their respective programmes. The other-observation is carried out either 
by scholars of communication- and/or media theory or by philosophers; but 
whereas the former are organised in academic disciplines, no established 
discipline entitled “media philosophy” exists until today. Instead, the vari-
ous approaches to philosophical analyses of media are heterogeneous and 
lack a solid theoretical basis as well as a disciplinary organisation. Some 
scholars even hold the view that media are not even within the province of 
philosophers.1
Some people deeply regret this deadlock regarding not only topics and 
discourses but also future jobs and positions for scholars of a discipline “me-
dia philosophy” to come. Others welcome this stalemate which gives room 
to creative solutions of thematic as well as of organisational matters. 
Let us have a short look at some of the foreseeable options.
One of the actual media philosophical approaches concentrates its efforts 
on a reformulation of traditional philosophical topics in the framework of 
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media efﬁciencies. The list of such topics is rather long and covers nearly all 
famous crucial subjects of philosophical discourses, reaching from reality, 
truth, culture, society, education or politics to time, space, emotion, subject or 
entertainment. This kind of rethinking or reformulating philosophical topics 
concentrates upon the question how—in the co-evolution of media systems 
and society—our daily experiences as well as our theoretical modellings of 
these topics have changed on the historical way from writing to the Internet. 
Some few examples may sufﬁce. 
• Consider the fundamental change which all concepts of time and space as 
well as all daily experiences of and with time and space have undergone 
since the introduction of the Internet. 
• Consider the stepwise implementation of research topics such as media 
pedagogic or media psychology in the evolution of media-culture socie-
ties. 
• Consider the questioning of all concepts and experiences of reality initi-
ated by electronic simulation and virtual realities. Today, zapping and in-
fotainment are equally serious philosophical topics as the transformation 
of politics into media performances or attempts to replace the ecclesiasti-
cally based religion by a “TV-mass”. 
Another media philosophical approach is primarily concerned with technical 
aspects of media and their efﬁciencies. It is argued that the traditional concept 
of man has faded away. Man has turned into a mere appendix of technical 
systems. His body (no more than tedious “wet ware”) step by step becomes 
replaced by hard ware taking over the relevant functions. The logic of ma-
chines substitutes the traditional order of knowledge. New kinds of social 
relations arise in globally operating networks, new play-cultures are devel-
oped. The digitalisation of democracy, the basic transformation of our modes 
of perception in the context of virtual realities or even the transition of our 
“death culture” into virtual memorials in the Internet appear on the agenda. 
These few examples already elucidate that a mere list of topics, concepts 
or organisational devices does not sufﬁce to establish a/the future “media 
philosophy”. Too many basic concepts wait for consensual deﬁnitions; too 
many selection problems regarding necessary, indispensable or solely addi-
tional topics of a future discipline “media philosophy” are still unresolved. 
Over and above, one cannot be sure, how the universities will develop in the 
near future in an international context of globalisation and informatisation. 
And, last but not least, we do no longer believe in any kind of ﬁnality—ex-
cept perhaps in the ﬁnality of transition.2
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Regarding this situation, in the following I shall try to deal with those ba-
sic problems in the discourse about “the media” which I consider sufﬁciently 
essential to attract the attention of all scholars of media research—no matter 
how this research domain shall be named and organised in the future. 
2. Language and/as medium?
Nearly every scholar participating in the discourses on media advocates 
his/her own media concept, and these concepts reach from light, sand and 
stone to technical distribution-media or symbolically generalised communi-
cation media (sensu N. Luhmann) such as love, money or power. Yet, most 
of the scholars agree that—of course—language is a medium, if not the 
“mother of all media”. 
In the philosophy of science it is widely accepted that deﬁnitions of con-
cepts should not be judged by their truth but by their acceptability and useful-
ness in relevant discourses. Accordingly I propose to establish a difference 
between language and medium.3 Language I model as a system consisting of 
material items which can serve as semiotic instruments. These language com-
ponents can be syntactically combined with each other to texts. Texts can be 
used in cognitive as well as in communicative processes in systems-speciﬁc 
ways. Accordingly, language can be observed from two perspectives: from a 
process oriented perspective the use of language (viz. speaking) is a speciﬁc 
social activity co-ordinating human beings; pursuant to a meaning- or sense-
oriented perspective language is used by speakers to construct meanings in 
their cognitive domains as well as to initiate understanding processes in the 
social domain of communication.
The materiality of language embodies socially stabilised experiences with 
the use of respective signs and texts in relevant contexts. Due to their sociali-
sation and to socially successful uses of language material the native speak-
ers of a language know keenly which cognitive operations are supposed to 
be attributed to the use(s) of a sign in a socially expected manner.—In this 
respect I still adhere to L. Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning as successful 
use of language.—The production of meaning on occasion of the percep-
tion of language material is bound to the cognitive domains of individuals. 
Since the production of meaning is necessarily determined by the presup-
positions and the conditions of action of the respective cognitive system, we 
must assume that meaning production is a highly subject-dependent process. 
Nevertheless even cognitive autonomous individuals are able to communi-
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cate successfully because, due to their socialisation, they all refer in a com-
parable way to collective (cultural) knowledge which brings about a social 
co-orientation of subject-dependent cognitive operations.
Hence, the materiality of language, cognitive processes and communi-
cation form a mutually constitutive framework of interactive dependencies 
(“Wirkungszusammenhang”) in the sense of the General Systems Theory 
(Schlosser 1993). As has been stated by many authors since H. R. Matu-
rana, language serves the purpose of coupling (in a purely structural way) 
the separated dimensions of cognition and communication. Texts or utter-
ances—as highly structured language offers—engender socially expected 
cognitive and communicative processes and orient those semantically with-
out being able to enforce in a causal way speciﬁc results a speaker or writer 
has intended or expected.
We cannot step back behind our socialisation, especially not behind our 
linguistic competence which can be brieﬂy drafted as a complex social com-
petence. We necessarily rely upon these competences whenever we make 
use of language material in cognition or communication. For this reason, our 
relation to our reality is fundamentally characterised by communicativity. 
Communication can only take place if partners are involved; and all com-
munication processes prepare cooperative actions. (cf. Janich 2006:260 ff.)
Knowledge resulting from actions transforms experiences into expecta-
tions. Both, experiences and expectations, are determined by the distinctions 
and descriptions a speciﬁc language offers their users, in other words they 
are conditioned by communicativity.
Communication is performed on the basis of collective knowledge which 
communication partners impute to one another. In other words, reﬂexivi-
ty can be regarded as the basic mechanism which enables communication 
although the communication partners are endowed with closed (self-organ-
izing) cognitive systems which can neither be directly observed nor inten-
tionally geared.
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3. A systems-oriented concept of ‘medium’
Regarding the variety of deﬁnitions and models of and for ‘medium’ used 
in the actual discussion a concept of ‘medium’ is needed which has to meet 
the following conditions:
• it has to be as unequivocal a possible
• it has to be rendered plausible by empirical applications
• it has to allow for relevant differentiations in the domain of observation 
• it has to be system-oriented in order to avoid open or merely additive 
concepts.
As set out on many other occasions I conceive of ‘medium’ as a compact 
concept (“Kompaktbegriff”) which integrates four dimensions and areas of 
effect:
• communication instruments (such as languages, non-verbal behaviour or 
gestures)
• technological devices (such as print, TV or Internet technology on the 
side of receivers and producers)
• the social systems bodies of such devices (such as publishing houses or 
television stations)
• media offers which result from the coalescence of these components and 
can only be interpreted referring to this complex context of production.
The cooperation of these four components is modelled as systemic and self-
organising. In these cooperation processes no component must remain unre-
spected.
Communication instruments such as languages are distinguished from 
media, because they can be used in all media. Therefore it makes sense to 
use the difference between communication instruments and media in order 
to observe and describe the differences in the uses of these instruments in 
the different media. Here, a given example could be the Internet as a hybrid 
medium.
The systemic interplay of the four components named above, I call me-
dium system. Examples for medium systems are the print system, the broad-
casting system, the television system or the ﬁlm system. The entirety of all 
medium systems available in a society I call the total media system of a 
society. 
In the various medium systems different action domains have arisen 
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which mutually constitute each other. Generally, four of these domains can 
be observed, viz. the production, distribution, reception and post processing4 
of media offers. In these domains different action roles have been developed 
which in course of history have been professionalised and differentiated in 
order to support a division of labour, so e. g. the role of the author, the player, 
the art director or the media agent. These action roles can be implement-
ed either by individual or by collective role takers such as teams or target 
groups. 
It is in the ordered cooperation of actions and communications that media 
offers are fabricated. Therefore, they have to be regarded as system-speciﬁc 
results of processes and not as autonomous identities—an argument which 
signiﬁcantly bears on all kinds of analysis, interpretation and evaluation of 
media offers.
The concept of action roles has the advantage that it can be applied to all 
medium systems. It enables exact observations of the differences between 
the medium systems and stimulates synchronical as well as diachronical re-
search. In addition it is strictly systems-oriented, enables an empirical analy-
sis of media offers and claims the differentiation between self-observation 
and other-observation (or observation from outside). 
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The systematisation of aspects and operations in media systems (called 
media processes) which could and should be observed and described in 
media analyses refer to:
• the components of medium systems (communication instruments, techni-
cal devices, social organisations, media offers)
• action roles (production, distribution, reception, post processing)
• reference systems (technique, economy, politics, law, socioculture)
• reaches (regional, national, international, global)
• directions of observation (diachronical, synchronical)
• kinds of observation (descriptive, normative).
All processes ongoing in a medium system are oriented by those subsystems 
of the culture of a society (= media culture) which shape media processes.
The argumentation presented so far leads to the following hypothesis:
The evolution of the total media system of modern media-culture societies 
from writing to the Internet has fundamentally changed our relation to the 
world and our modes of communication. This change can be described as 
transition from communicativity to mediality.5
4. Inﬂuences, efﬁciencies, causalities: 
What does ‘mediality’ mean?
In the discussion about the mediality of our relation to the world various 
positions compete with one another. The range of hypotheses ranks from 
“man dominates the media” to “man has become a function of media-tech-
niques”.6 This discussion suffers from a remarkable ambiguity of crucial 
terms like ‘inﬂuence’, ‘efﬁciency’ or ‘causality’. Regarding this situation, 
let me remind of some plausible trivialities.
(a) Even the most developed semiconductor driven systems are (still?) 
produced by men no matter what is hidden behind the user’s interface. If no-
body uses these technical systems they are worthless, and so far men (still?) 
decide upon the meaning of these uses and not (yet?) the technical systems 
themselves. One of the aﬁcionados of the primacy of technique, Rudolf 
Maresch, quite recently remarked that the machines lack what deﬁnes men: 
imagination, subconsciousness and emotionality of experience. “Informa-
tion might be collected, stored and transferred in computer centres, but only 
in humans’ brains which operate them, information becomes knowledge.” 
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(2006:5; my translation)
(b) I fully subscribe to Maresch’s position. On the other hand it should 
not be overlooked that technical devices are not at all neutral components of 
media systems. Since Marshall McLuhan, many scholars have emphasised 
that medium systems exercise structural effects on the users which are inde-
pendent from the effects semantic contents of media offers can trigger.
Knuth Hickethier has summed up such structural effects:
• construction and standardisation of our time concepts and our time 
experience
• insight into the semiotic nature of our relation to the world
• steering of attention
• shaping of emotions
• ranking of important and unimportant things
• presentation of kinds of behaviour
• orientation of socialisation and social adaptation (2003:230 ff.).
(c) Both communication instruments and all media since the emergence 
of writing have on the one hand expanded our forms of perception and on 
the other hand disciplined them in relation to the various medium-speciﬁc 
conditions of perception and use. This explains why there are literates and 
illiterates for every medium. 
(d) Therefore, media offers are not independent objects but results of 
rather complex production, distribution and presentation processes follow-
ing the economic, social and technical conditions of the respective medium 
systems. In other words: medium systems are necessarily conditioned by 
their systems-speciﬁc logic. This also proves true for media actors’ concepts 
of events, persons, data or objects beyond the respective medium system. By 
media processes such events, persons etc. are transformed into media facts 
which result from medium-speciﬁc references to reasonable and relevant 
presuppositions of all activities in the respective medium system. Accord-
ingly, medium systems create and distribute media facts and not representa-
tions of facts or events in “the reality”. It is worth while to keep that in mind 
in any discussion about media and reality.7
(e) As already mentioned linear causal interventions into cognitive or so-
cial systems are not possible because these systems can only operate follow-
ing their systems- speciﬁc presuppositions and working conditions. There-
fore, it is implausible to apply models of linear causality to the analysis of 
the relation between men ad media systems. More than 30 years of rather 
unsuccessful research in media effects underpin this view. 
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The assumption that media provide actors and societies with objective in-
formation and knowledge neglects the constitutive and strictly complemen-
tary role of the recipients. Media offers do not transport knowledge, mean-
ings and values; instead, they offer actors well structured semiotic materials 
which can then be used by actors for the production of meaning, knowledge 
or evaluation in their respective biographical and social situation—herein, 
an account for our sparse knowledge about the actual effectiveness of media 
offers might be endued.
Therefore, applying models of co-evolution and enabling conditions 
seems to be plausible. The history of media reveals that new technologies 
have only succeeded if a relevant number of users made use of those. Only 
then new needs of communication could isochronously be developed and 
served, thus necessarily changing the relation to the world of users as well as 
of non-users of the new medium. Wilhelm Ong and Eric Havelock have pro-
vided evidence for this hypothesis, Elisabeth Eisenstein as well as Michael 
Giesecke speciﬁed that for the printing press. They all show that the devel-
opment and the success of a new medium system can be regarded as creation 
as well as formation of new societal needs. For this reason, I propose to work 
with models of circular causality which sufﬁciently respect the reﬂexivity of 
all conditions of the emergence and the acceptance of new media and their 
applications, including the observation of structural as well as semantic ef-
fects. 
So far, my considerations regarding ‘mediality’, can be summed up as 
follows. 
By their activities in media systems men create media-worlds (or media-
realities) which compete with one another. Media systems work as observ-
ing and describing systems which do not start from “the reality” but from 
former descriptions of reality which accordingly are transformed into or fol-
lowed by new descriptions. On this note, the description of reality and the 
reality of description coincide. This argument resolves the tedious question 
regarding the relation of media and reality. Due to their system-speciﬁc logic 
media cannot represent an extra medial reality in an objective way. Instead, 
they can only produce and present medium- speciﬁc realities.
In this view we can observe a threefold observing constellation: 
• Recipients of media offers observe what medium systems observe and 
how this observation is realised and presented. In other words, they (can) 
develop a competence of second order observation by observing observ-
ers. This second order competence necessarily reveals the contingency8 
of all observations and descriptions: other things could have been de-
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scribed and the descriptions could have been different.
• Reﬂexivity of observation and description also holds true for the medium 
systems themselves, which observe and describe one another regarding 
the media offers produced as well as regarding interests and modes of 
observation and description.
• Media observe and describe the society, but in turn society observes the 
running of the media. Here the question arises how much second-order 
observation both sides can endure and if and how they can make use of it 
in a creative way.
The insight into the mediality of our relation to the world gives rise to two 
basic problems:
• From an epistemological point of view we nowadays are mostly con-
cerned with realities adopted from the media, normally without consider-
ing the system’s logic, i.e. the conditions of production and reception of 
the respective medium system. 
• From a socio-political point of view we have to respect the power medi-
um systems consciously or unconsciously (still?) put into effect upon the 
recipients due to their sovereignty of public observation and description. 
Television e.g. still disposes an important factor of inﬂuencing or even 
deﬁning central categories of our social orientation such as democracy 
and freedom, terrorism and resistance or power and violence, but also 
emotion and taste, appearance and property, gender and partnership. We 
know from various empirical studies how many young people use the 
daily TV-soaps as instruments for orienting their own lives. Accordingly, 
programme makers bear a heavy load of responsibility which they must 
either accept or publicly reject—for what kind of reason so ever.9 (Events 
like the publication of amateur photographs showing the maltreatment of 
Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib in the Internet make us realise how impor-
tant the sheer disposing of pictures can be in a medium system which is 
globally accessible and (not yet?) censored—even the US-Senate had to 
accept these pictures as pieces of evidence.)
The discussion about the mediality of our relation to the world has quasi 
automatically provoked a debate between epistemological realists and con-
structivists (sometimes far away of argumentative fairness) about the rela-
tion between reality and representation. In the following I shall therefore 
shortly comment on this debate, nota bene not with the intention to solve this 
problem but to resolve it.10
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5. Media and reality, or:  
 On the seduction by unobserved dualisms
In the last years some philosophers, ﬁrst of all Josef Mitterer11, have ar-
gued that the history of European philosophy has been and still is widely 
dominated by the postulation of seemingly evident dualisms such as lan-
guage/reality, subject/object, media/reality, description/object of description, 
facts/statements or perception/object of perception. In 1998, Martin Seel 
once again propagated the resolution of the opposition realism/constructiv-
ism in the framework of his “philosophical realism”—which, unfortunately, 
is based itself upon a basic dualism. I quote: “Only because there are objects 
which exist independently of our knowledge media can have a recognizing 
access to objects.” (1998:352; my translation) In opposition to this seem-
ingly irrefutable argument, Josef Mitterer has claimed that the dualism of 
object and description must and can be resolved, because the description and 
the object of description are one and the same. In our discourses—and that is 
the domain of our living, acting, and communicating—we fabricate descrip-
tions of objects so far which serve as starting point for further descriptions 
from now on. 
This argument can be reformulated in use of another terminology. Let 
us take as an example the processes of perception or description. An actor 
performs a perception process in the course and as a result of which he per-
ceives something as something. In a process of description an actor describes 
something which appears as an object of this description. In other words, 
these are three-part processes in which no single component is independent: 
perceiver, perception process and perceived are mutually self-constituting.
This analysis reveals that all events and actions relating to human con-
sciousness are systems-speciﬁc since they are tied to context-speciﬁc opera-
tions of actors. In other words, talk of objects can only mean talk of objects-
of-perception or objects-of-description. The actor must not be disregarded, 
and actors consist of bodies and brains. Objects, as Werner Heisenberg once 
said, are relations, references or posited reference. 
In the light of these considerations I propose to switch deliberately from 
the description of (identical) objects to the analysis of (complex) processes. 
Accordingly, I do no longer ask whether or not an object X exists or whether 
our perception and description of X is true or false. Instead, I ask which 
process is running under which conditions and presuppositions, who per-
forms this process and what kind of results arise for the actors involved in 
this process.
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Following this argumentation Seel’s seemingly clear argument can be re-
solved. To quote Seel: “Although the objects of recognition cannot be given 
to the perceiver in a language-independent way, they can exist independently 
from all perceiving. The earth has existed long before any thought about the 
shape of the earth.” (1998:36; Seel’s emphasis, my translation) As a counter-
argument let me quote from (the non-constructivist thinker) Carl Friedrich 
von Weizsäcker: “Whenever we speak seriously of reality, we speak of real-
ity, if nobody speaks of reality, reality is not talked about.” (1980:42; my 
translation)—The interesting point here is that von Weizsäcker does neither 
assert nor deny the existence of reality. Instead, he points to the insight that 
without someone referring to reality reality is not part of a discourse; but 
only in discourses can we talk about the existence or non-existence of real-
ity or what else. Both, Mitterer and von Weizsäcker, emphasise that we—as 
human beings—can only act in place (here and now) of discourses. In these 
discourses we can aver the existence of all and everything in a beyond of 
discourses—statements we make here and now by reference to statements or 
descriptions which have been produced so far.
This argumentation can be backed by the following consideration12: What-
ever we do, we do it in the gestalt of a positing or supposition (“Setzung”). 
We do this (something), not that (something else), although we could have 
done it. A supposition always takes a certain gestalt for us as well—should 
we be under observation—as for the others: it is a supposition of type A and 
not type B, C, M or X.
As far as we can judge within a lifetime, every single supposition that 
we are making here and now has been preceded by other suppositions to 
which we (can) relate as presuppositions (“Voraussetzungen”) more or less 
consciously. All our suppositions to date therefore form a context of sup-
positions in given concrete situations. We can refer to this context by way 
of memories and narratives now. This context of suppositions comprises the 
totality of our prior life experiences that will, in turn, affect our future expe-
riences in terms of expectations in every concrete situation. 
Every supposition makes at least one presupposition. As a rule, however, 
many presuppositions are made or drawn upon by a supposition. The nexus 
between supposition and presupposition is auto-constitutive as neither can 
be meaningfully envisaged without the other. Therefore, supposition and 
presupposition are strictly complementary. The presupposition of a supposi-
tion can only be observed in the reﬂexive reference to the supposition. If one 
accepts the auto-constitution of supposition and presupposition, then one 
also accepts that there can be no beginning exempt from a presupposition. 
The only possible beginning is—to make a supposition.
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Whether we perceive or describe something, ponder something or be-
come consciously aware of something as something particular, we are al-
ways executing a serious game of distinctions. We (and not anyone else) de-
scribe (and do not explain) something as that particular something (and not 
as something else). In doing so we make use of linguistic resources whose 
semantic potential and social acceptance is tacitly presumed and, at the same 
time, by this very use conﬁrmed as “viable” (i.e. as manageable or success-
ful in the understanding of E. von Glasersfeld). All this is realised (meaning 
nothing but: all this we can envisage or think in this way only, not in any 
other) as a happening in a particular situation at a particular point in time, i.e. 
in a context of suppositions. 
Suppositions constitute contingency, because they must be selective re-
garding other options. As selections they are decisions, and only qua deci-
sions do they make contingency observable. This means that selection and 
contingency must be envisaged jointly, they constitute each other, they are 
strictly complementary. 
Let me recapitulate: All our cognitive and communicative processes are 
suppositions which rely on presuppositions. The most important presuppo-
sitions in this respect are language and media, modelled in terms of frame-
works of interactive dependencies which interrelate materialities and pos-
sible semantic contents in a systemic way, followed by collective cultural 
knowledge as the basis and outcome of socialisation. Due to this cultural 
knowledge which opens up the range of reﬂexivity in terms of expected 
expectations and imputed imputations cognitive autonomous individuals 
are able to cooperate and to communicate with one another. By culture, I 
understand the problem-solving programme of societies which orients the 
activities of actors and is in turn conﬁrmed and stabilised by these oriented 
activities.
Discourses function via the co-presence of materiality and meaning con-
struction processes. This contemporarity deﬁnes the mediality of our rela-
tion to the world. Language is inseparably bound to materialities; media 
are necessarily bound to technicality. For this reason there is no withdraw-
al of communicativity and mediality. Therefore, I consider it plausible to 
coin media-oriented societies as media-culture societies which deserve a 
thorough analysis in the framework of media-cultural studies—however 
they will be entitled in future times.
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6. Media science or media philosophy?
In their extensive research report, Christian Filk et al. (2004) have de-
scribed the different approaches towards “a” media philosophy. As already 
mentioned in the beginning, rather controversial arguments have been is-
sued. Some authors claim that philosophy has always been media philoso-
phy avant la lettre which is simply to be prolonged into the future. Others 
call for the establishing of a new neo-pragmatist discipline which is able to 
solve practical problems in our society (Sandbothe 2001). F. Hartmann, on 
the other hand, recommends organising media philosophy as an interdisci-
plinary research platform and not as an academic discipline.
A short look at the long lasting efforts to install a new discipline called 
Kulturwissenschaft immediately reduces the attractivity of the idea of found-
ing a new academic discipline called “media philosophy”. It is well known 
that inner disciplinary conﬂicts, the permanent ﬁght for a reasonable dis-
tribution of money, personal rivalry etc. frequently destroy creativity and 
engagement in social organisations like academic disciplines.
In addition, the subject “media & mediality” is of such importance that 
we must not be afraid that it might fall into oblivion when nobody adminis-
trates it ex ofﬁcio.
These considerations recommend an interdisciplinary approach to media 
problems in the organisational context of a research programme.13 In such a 
context the observation and description of all aspects of mediality from the 
perspectives of various disciplines can be organised according to the prob-
lems arising via the development of the total media system of our society. 
The media development does not wait for a media philosophy which notori-
ously runs late. Neither the established media- and communication sciences 
nor a philosophy which integrates the media into their research programme 
should take over the full responsibility for the topic “mediality”, anymore 
since both are still deeply rooted in their dualistic epistemological traditions 
and still maintain old-fashioned quasi-alternatives like theoretical/empirical 
or empirical/hermeneutic. 
Prospectively, we need extensive empirical research onto the full range 
of aspects of media processes on the basis of explicit theories, concepts and 
methods which allow for second order observations and legitimate itself via 
consequential results. Such results concern all kinds of participation in me-
dia processes in the cognitive as well as in the social domain. They should 
help us to extend our critical and creative use of media.
Media research must become aware of its autological character, which is 
to say that media can only be studied in media and the results must be pre-
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sented in media, too. This insight has not been realised in those philosophies 
and sciences which have been determined by writing and books. As soon as 
we realise that there are no contents outside the media we have to accept that 
research in media has to invest deliberately all possibilities of observation 
and description offered by all media. In the times to come new concepts of 
science and aesthetics, of rationality and creativity should and will for sure 
be developed in order to serve the needs of a media research programme we 
can only imagine today.
Historical research has revealed the co-evolution of medium systems, so-
cieties and individuals since the invention of language and writing. This 
development and its impact on the full complexity of our living in media-
culture societies should be the grand subject of media research including all 
its cognitive, emotional, moral and social aspects.
Of course it should not be forgotten that all kinds of media research need 
active researchers and ﬁnancial resources. So the question arises whether or 
not well established scholars will be able and ready to orient their research 
interest towards aspects of mediality (which is difﬁcult to believe regarding 
the teaching load in times of the Bologna process), whether or not new aca-
demic positions will be created for this speciﬁc research topic (which is not 
very likely regarding the economic situation of the universities). The best 
solution would be to establish coordinators to organise the interdisciplinary 
media research—but this issue is foremost a political one.
However these questions will be answered we face the following situa-
tion: If it is true that any society gets the media system deserved (just be-
cause the media are social constructions for the construction of societies and 
their realities) then we need a system of observations and descriptions of all 
media which is capable to solve this societal problem. We are just starting 
to develop such a system. Nevertheless, I am sure that the solution of this 
problem belongs to the most crucial tasks of our media-culture societies.
Notes
1. See e. g. Margreiter 2007.
2. See Schmidt 2007.
3. See Schmidt 2000.
4. ‚Post processing’ covers all processes in which media offers are transposed into new 
media offers, e. g. screen adaptations of novels, the scientiﬁc analysis of daily soaps 
or all kinds of media critique.
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5. See Krämer 1998 or Margreiter 2007:17.—This transition also concerns face-to-face 
communication which can only be described in contrast to communication media-
ted by media and their impact upon direct communication. 
6. See Maresch 2006.—In communication studies this alternative has been discussed 
since Blumler & Katz 1974 who coined the famous questions: “What do people do 
with the media?” And “What do media do with the people?”
7. See Schmidt 2005a and Pörksen 2006.
8. According to the philosophical tradition everything which is neither necessary nor 
impossible is called ‚contingent’. 
9. See Schmidt 2005.
10. See the details in Schmidt 2007, 2007 a.
11. See Mitterer 1992, 2001.
12. Schmidt 2007.
13. The same proposal has been published by the German Wissenschaftsrat in May 
2007.
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